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Conclusion: The Emergence of a Presumption of Continuity of Treaties
Introduction
The issue of State succession to treaties is undoubtedly one of the most controversial ones in international law. 1 It has long been the battleground for opposing schools of thought.
2 In a nutshell, supporters of the theory of tabula rasa (clean slate) argue that a new State (the "successor" State) does not succeed to the treaties to which the predecessor State was a party. On the contrary, defendants of the theory of continuity believe that a succession to treaties by a new State is automatic. This paper examines the following question: is the new successor State automatically bound by the multilateral treaties to which the predecessor State was a party at the date of succession? 3 It must be emphasised at the outset that our analysis is limited to the question of succession to multilateral treaties and that it focuses only on one type of succession of States: secession.
We begin our analysis by defi ning the term "secession" in order to distinguish it from other cases of dismemberment of States (part two). The issue of succession to treaties in the event of secession will only be analysed after having succinctly examined the recent practice of States in the context of dissolution of States (part three). The third part of this paper examines the practice of secessionist States prior to the adoption of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 4 The paper will investigate Pakistan, Singapore and Bangladesh as States that exemplify this practice. The practice adopted by these secessionist States has generally followed the principle of tabula rasa. The fourth part examines the regime established under the 1978 Vienna Convention in the specifi c case of secession. In this part, we will present a history of the work of the International Law Commission (ILC), including its numerous internal confl icts that have resulted in the adoption of the principle of continuity of treaties, which was in fact contrary to the practice of secessionist States at the time. Lastly, we will analyse State practice with regard to succession to treaties in the recent case of the secession of Montenegro (2006) In this context, the predecessor State should therefore be considered as the "continuator" State because its existence is not affected by the secession of part of its territory.
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not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases". 14 In any event, the Supreme Court of Canada rightly concluded that "international law may well adapt to recognize a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps leading to its creation" 15 and that if a secession is "successful in the streets, it might well lead to the creation of a new state". 16 In the end, the "ultimate success" of secession will "dependent on recognition by the international community." 17
Succinct Analysis of Contemporary State Practice of Succession of States to Treaties in the Context of Dissolution of States
Although our study focuses on cases of secession, it is nevertheless useful to briefl y review contemporary State practice in the context of dissolution of States. The principle of continuity of treaties has been adopted by several States in various cases of State dissolution that occurred in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, such as those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Third party States, like the member States of the European Union, have also adopted the position of continuity of treaties. 18 Furthermore, the evolution of the American government's position on the question is particularly interesting. Before the 1990s, the United States supported the application of the rule of tabula rasa in cases of State succession, as stated by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 19 This document was however strongly criticised for not refl ecting contemporary international law on the question. 20 The United States now favours the application of the principle of continuity of treaties: 
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U.S. interests in maintaining the stability of legal rights and obligations are, on balance, better served by adopting a presumption that treaty relations remain in force. This is consistent with the efforts of the United States to foster respect for the rule of law around the world. In the broadest sense, therefore, it is essential to develop international legal principles that tend to support the stability of legal rights and obligations. … In sum, while we recognized that the law in this area is somewhat unsettled, we decided that the better legal position was to presume continuity in treaty relations.
21
Some writers have noted that the adoption of this new US approach has been largely infl uenced by American foreign policy objectives.
22
The vast majority of author s also recognise that the recent practice of new States emerging from dissolution of States generally follows the principle of automatic continuity of treaties.
23 This is certainly true for multilateral treaties of "universal character" as well as those treaties creating border regimes and territorial regimes. 
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The application of this principle of automatic continuity does not, however, extend to treaties concluded between a restricted number of partners, 25 such as regional or bilateral treaties. 26 The same is true for "political" or "personal" treaties. 27 Furthermore, issues of succession in the context of international organizations are governed by the particular regime set out by each institution. One controversial issue debated by writers is whether the successor State is automatically bound by the human rights instruments ratifi ed by the predecessor State.
28
The use of the term "automatic continuity" must nonetheless be nuanced. For instance, recent State practice reveals that successor States have generally given notifi cations of their will to "succeed" to the treaties of the predecessor State or to "continue" to be a party to them. As a matter of principle, the very fact that a new State notifi es its intention to be bound by a treaty is proof in itself that there is no "automatic" succession to treaties. Thus, no such notifi cation should logically be required if any principle of truly automatic succession were to exist. But the situation is slightly more complicated than that. Some States, for instance, have sent a notifi cation precisely in order to expresses their desire to be automatically bound by a treaty. 29 In these cases, the aim of notifi cation must be analysed as proof of continuity of treaty application rather than discontinuity. In this respect, reference should be made to the attitude of depositary States of multilateral treaties, as well as that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Their expectation has been to receive formal "confi rmations" from States wishing to succeed to the treaties of their predecessors. 30 Therefore, it is best to speak of the application of a principle of continuity of treaties, which would, in fact, not be "automatic".
31
From this diverse practice in the context of dissolution of States, only a few writers have concluded to the emergence of a customary rule in favour of continuity of treaties. 32 In fact, a number of authors have, on the contrary, argued in favour of the application of the rule of tabula rasa whereby the new State would have complete 25 
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In the present section, our analysis will focus in particular on the practice of States in relation to three cases of secession which have occurred since the creation of the UN, namely Pakistan, Singapore and Bangladesh. These three cases are generally recognised as being examples of secession. 38 3.1. Pakistan In the months leading up to the independence of India from the British Indian Empire, several serious incidents of inter-religious violence took place (between Hindus and Muslims). It eventually led to the "partition" of British India into two distinct States: India and Pakistan. India has generally been considered as the continuing State of the British Indian Empire, while Pakistan was viewed as having seceded from India in 1947 right after India's independence. 39 This qualifi cation is rather superfi cial, as both India and Pakistan actually became independent States at the same time as a result of the adoption of a law by the British Parliament.
40
Following this "secession", the question arose as to whether Pakistan should automatically succeed to the treaties to which British India was a party. The devolution agreement provided that Pakistan would automatically succeed to these treaties. 41 While Pakistan had redeemed its position as an automatic successor to some of these treaties, it has not adopted such position with respect to all treaties to which British India was a party. 42 In fact, Pakistan's position of automatic successor (for some treaties) was not accepted by the United Nations and other States. 43 Ultimately, Pakistan 
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had to act as though it had not automatically succeeded to the treaties concluded by British India and decided to ratify those treaties to which it wanted to accede. 44 Pakistan also made formal applications to become a member of international organisations. 45 The principle of the non-succession to treaties was also the position adopted by the Pakistan Supreme Court. 46 The 
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Court did not have to address this issue. 48 Only Judge ad hoc Pirzada, in his dissenting opinion, ruled in favour of the automatic succession of Pakistan to the General Act of 1928 as a result of the 1947 devolution agreement.
Different interpretations have been adopted by writers regarding Pakistan's practice. Some authors have used this example to support their claim that the rule of tabula rasa most accurately refl ects post WWII State practice in the context of secession. 49 Other authors have adopted a more nuanced reading of this example.
50
Some have even argued that Pakistan's practice, in fact, supports the principle of continuity of treaties. 51 On balance, this practice appears to support the principle of tabula rasa. 53 At the time, the territory of Singapore remained under British domination until 1963 when Singapore was attached to the Federation of Malaysia. 54 The union was of short duration. Only two years later, in 1965, Singapore peacefully seceded from Malaysia to become an independent State. 55 This process was interpreted as a case of secession (and not one of dissolution of State) insofar as the integration of Singapore in the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order. India relied, inter alia, on the Barlas Brothers case to argue that Pakistan had never been party to the Act. 48 The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute based on India's reservation contained in its declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The Court also concluded that it did not have jurisdiction as a result of India's notifi cation of denunciation of the Act made in 1974. 49 Meriboute, supra note 35, at pp. 144-147. This is also the position adopted by the ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, Twenty-Sixth Session, supra note 13, at p. 264. 50 Udokang, supra note 2, at p. 178, for whom Pakistan's position was driven by political rather than legal factors. 51 For Pereira, supra note 44, at pp. 62-63, 97, other States have generally accepted Pakistan as the successor to the treaties to which the Dominion was a party. The United Nations' refusal to accept this position is therefore isolated. O'Connell, supra note 11, at pp. 128-129, believes that Pakistan generally succeeded to the treaty to which the Dominion was a party based on the devolution agreement (Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order) rather than on the application of any principle of succession to treaties. 
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Malaysia in 1963 had been considered by the United Nations as a simple extension of Malaysia's territory, and not as a fusion of two States.
56
The agreement of secession and devolution concluded between Malaysia and Singapore in 1965 provided for Singapore's automatic succession to treaties to which Malaysia was a party. 57 However, Singapore's actual practice appears to have deviated from the solution prescribed for in the devolution agreement. It followed instead the rule of tabula rasa. 58 Thus, instead of automatically succeeding to the treaties to which Malaysia was a party, Singapore denounced or revised the majority of them.
59
This also appears to be the case of the agreement concluded between Japan and Malaysia relative to aerial services. 62 Contrary to the two previous examples, in the case of Bangladesh there was no devolution agreement. In practice, Bangladesh considered itself a new State originating from the process of decolonisation and consequently adopted the tabula rasa position. Bangladesh has thus sent a number of declarations to international organisations indicating its willingness to succeed to a number of multilateral treaties. 63 In conclusion, it appears that in the two cases where devolution agreements provided for the continuity of treaties, the actual practice of secessionist States has nonetheless been diversifi ed. In one case (Singapore), the successor State preferred to adopt the rule of tabula rasa rather than to follow the regime prescribed for in the devolution agreement. In the other case (Pakistan), the rule of the tabula rasa was to some extent imposed by members of the international community. Finally, the example of Bangladesh seems to support the application of the rule of the tabula rasa.
Therefore, the practice of States in the context of secession after WWII indicates that successor States have generally applied the rule of tabula rasa whereby they do not have to assume the conventional obligations of the predecessor State, unless they freely accept such responsabilities. 64 Thus, according to the ILC, 65 as well as the Internation al Law Association, 66 the practice of secessionist States prior to the adoption of the 1978 Vienna Convention reveals that there was no automatic succession to treaties concluded by the predecessor State.
4.
The . The principle of tabula rasa applies to Newly Independent States which are therefore not automatically bound by treaties entered into by the predecessor (colonial) State. The regime applicable to those other non-colonial situations will be analysed in the following section.
The Principle of Continuity of Treaties
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention outlines the regime applicable to cases of "separation" of States. It provides for the application of the principle of continuity of treaties. This provision uses the term "separation" to actually refer to the different concepts that are "secession" and "dissolution" of States. The principle of continuity therefore applies to both cases. It should be noted that Article 34 endorses the principle of automatic succession to treaties whereby the successor State is ipso facto bound by treaties entered into by the predecessor State without the requirement of any notifi cation by that State. However, this rule of continuity bears two exceptions where tabula rasa applies: when the implicated parties have specifi cally agreed for the application of the tabula rasa rule, and where the automatic application of the treaty to the successor State would be "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation". 68 The fi nal wording of Article 34, in terms of the applicable regime in the case of secession, is the result of several developments which can be succinctly summarised in the following three phases: -First phase: A clear distinction is made between cases of secession and dissolution of States which are examined separately; secession cases are assimilated to "Newly Independent States"; the rule of tabula rasa applies to all secession cases; -Second phase: Cases of secession and dissolution of States are now examined together; the principle of continuity generally applies to cases of secession, except for those situations where a secession can be assimilated to that of a "Newly Independent State", in which case, the tabula rasa rule applies; -Third phase: The above-mentioned exception is dropped; the principle of continuity of treaties applies to all secession cases.
In the initial phase of its work, the ILC's Draft Articles of 1972 clearly distinguished between cases of dissolution of States (Article 27) and those of "separation of one part of a State" (Article 28). Article 28 provided as follows: 
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1.
If part of the territory of a State separates from it and becomes an individual State, any treaty which at the date of the separation was in force in respect of that State continues to bind it in relation to its remaining territory, unless: (a) It is otherwise agreed; or (b) It appears from the treaty or from its object and purpose that the treaty was intended to relate only to the territory which has separated from that State or the effect of the separation is radically to transform the obligations and rights provided for in the treaty. 2. In such a case, the individual State emerging from the separation is to be considered as being in the same position as a newly independent State in relation to any treaty which at the date of separation was in force in respect of the territory now under its sovereignty.
The fi rst paragraph of this provision indicates that in the event of secession, the continuator State remains bound by the treaties it had entered into at the date of secession. The second paragraph states that the secessionist State must be considered as having the same position as a Newly Independent State with regards to all treaties.
69
This is because the ILC concluded that:
The available evidence of practice does not therefore support the thesis that in the case of a separation of part of a State, as distinct from the dissolution of a State, treaties continue in force ipso jure in respect of the territory of the separated State. On the contrary, evidence strongly indicates that the separated territory which becomes a sovereign State is to be regarded as a newly independent State to which in principle the rules of the present draft articles concerning newly independent States should apply.
70
In other words, according to the Draft Articles of 1972, the rule of tabula rasa should apply not only to cases of "Newly Independent States", but also to situations of secession. At the time, the Commission had thus decided that cases of secession should not be treated any differently than the special case of "Newly Independent States" since in both situations the detachment of a territory often occurred in the context of intense political tension, accompanied by violence. 71 There was indeed a presumption that in both cases the new State had not participated in the elaboration of the treaties concluded by the predecessor State and that consequently it would be unjust for the new State to be bound by such treaties. It was therefore decided that the application of the rule of tabula rasa was preferable in all instances of secession. This solution would prevent the "imposition" of any treaties upon the new State. Moreover, some 
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ILC members found support in State practice for the application of the rule of tabula rasa in situations of secession. 72 In sum, in the early 1970s, the application of the rule of tabula rasa to cases of secession was generally admitted by the members of the Commission, and in particular by members from Western States.
73
At its 26th session, the ILC decided to re-examine the relevance of distinguishing between cases of dissolution of States and those of secession. It determined that examples of dissolution of State had been exclusively examined from the perspective of "union of States", where "the component parts of the union retained a measure of individual identity during the existence of the union". 74 The Commission therefore decided to analyse cases of dissolution of States as being one aspect of a more general category that would include those cases of secession. 75 In other words, for the Commission, both situations should be handled by one single provision. This was the solution adopted by the Commission in Article 33 of the fi nal draft of 1974. Article 33 provided as follows:
When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist: (a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed; (b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has become a successor State continues in force in respect of that successor State alone. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible with its object and purpose or would radically change the conditions for the operation of the treaty. 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, if a part of the territory of a State separates from it and becomes a State in circumstances which are essentially of the same character as those existing in the case of the formation of a newly inde- The fi rst paragraph of this provision provides for the same regime of continuity of treaties to apply in both cases of secession and dissolution. 76 An exception at the third paragraph of Article 33 was then inserted as an addition to this rule of continuity. This was because the ILC realised that "the available evidence of practice during the United Nations period appears to indicate that, at least in some circumstances, the separated territory which becomes a sovereign State may be regarded as a newly independent State to which in principle the rules of the present draft articles concerning newly independent States should apply". 77 The new paragraph therefore stipulated that the principle of tabula rasa (and not that of continuity) would still apply to those special cases of secession "where the separation occurred in circumstances which were essentially of the same character as those existing in the case of the formation of a newly independent State". 78 In other words, the rule of continuity was to apply generally to cases of secession except for those specifi c situations where a separation could be compared to the decolonization context (and where tabula rasa would thus apply).
It is at this junction that the ILC's analytical shift occurred. In order to determine the regime applicable to treaties concluded by the predecessor State, the Commission was now essentially focussing on the question of whether or not a new secessionist State could be assimilated to a "Newly Independent State". This analysis was done by examining whether or not the new secessionist State had effectively participated in the elaboration of treaties concluded by the predecessor State. The evaluation of this degree of participation therefore became the focal point in deciding if a secessionist State should be bound by the predecessor State's treaties. 79 For the Commission, the principle of continuity of treaties should apply to a secessionist State whenever (before secession) the territorial entity had participated in the decisional process leading to the ratifi cation of a treaty by the predecessor State. In these circumstances, it could be said that the territorial entity had somewhat "consented" to such treaties and that the new State should, consequently, be bound by it. In the case of a "Newly Independent State" there would, on the contrary, be a presumption to the opposite effect. It was thus assumed that a new State emerging from decolonisation would not have participated in the elaboration of treaties concluded by the predecessor State. In these circumstances, it would be unjust to impose upon the new State the content of such treaties once it acquired independence. 
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As a result of this analytical shift, the rule of tabula rasa would no longer apply to secessionist States as a consequence of the codifi cation of past State practice, which, as the Commission expressly acknowledged, supported the rule of tabula rasa. 80 The rule of tabula rasa would rather fi nd application only because in some circumstances cases of secession could be assimilated to those of "Newly Independent States". The content of this third paragraph was, however, openly criticised by representatives of developing States because it was (apparently) favouring secessionist movements. 81 It is essentially for t his reason that the third paragraph of Article 33 was ultimately removed from the fi nal version of the text in 1978. 82 The abandonment of this third paragraph of Article 33 (which would later become Article 34 during the adoption of the Convention in 1978) resulted in the integral application of the principle of continuity of treaties to all cases of secession, even those instances of secession that could be assimilated to "Newly Independent States".
In sum, the Commission essentially based its decision regarding the legal regime applicable to treaties in situations of secession on eminently political motives. This is because States generally condemn the idea of secession in international law. States are consequently reluctant to create a legal regime that could in any way be perceived as favourable to groups or movements envisaging secession. 83 The regime of tabula rasa was perceived by many ILC members as being somehow too favourable to secessionist States. This general concern about not encouraging secessionist movements ultimately led to choosing the principle of treaty continuity as the applicable legal regime instead. In truth, it is not at all clear how the application of the rule of continuity can, in any way, have the effect of diminishing the willingness of a people to become an independent State by way of secession. Can the rather technical issue of succession to treaties realistically create a roadblock in a people's path to independence? In the end, what is clear is that the wording of Article 34 was the result of a political decision. This is evident from the fact that State practice supported the application of the tabula rasa rule to instances of secession. 
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The Absence of Customary Value of That Principle
The Vienna Convention has been widely criticised by the majority of authors. 84 The grounds for such cr iticism are diverse, including the Convention's emphasis on "Newly Independent States " arising from decolonisation at the time (1978) when this phenomenon was near its end. 85 Authors do not condemn the application of the principle of continuity of treaties to cases of dissolution of State insofar as this corresponds to State practice. 86 They are very critical, however, of the application of this principle in the different context of secession. The grouping together of cases of secession and dissolution of State is considered by many as being artifi cial. Moreover, the rule contained at Article 34 is said to be contrary to State practice in the context of secession. 87 We share the point of v iew adopted by Judge Kreca in his dissenting opinion in the 
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34 can only be considered as a mere "progressive development of law", and not as a codifi cation of customary international law.
88
Beyond these considerations, it must be asked whether or not any codifi cation on the matter of State succession is, on the one hand, realistic and possible and, on the other hand, necessary and useful. 89 It should be recalled that the Convention stands as a supplementary mechanism, wherein it always allows States to conclude an agreement that derogates from its dispositions. This is expressly provided for at Article 34(2). In fact, the majority of disputes with regards to questions of succession of States are resolved on a consensual basis between the directly implicated States. These settlements are often more infl uenced by political considerations than by legal arguments. Also, it is not rare for equity to come into play in matters involving State succession. 90 The practical effect of any codifi cation efforts in the area of succession of States is also limited. Thus, the text of the Vienna Convention is only binding on the few States that have become party to the treaty. Its content is thus not obligatory for third party States; unless of course, it can be concluded that a given provision codifi es customary law on the topic. But this is clearly not the case of Article 34 with respect to secession which does not represent customary law. This means that in practical terms, a new secessionist State is simply not bound by the continuity principle as set out under this provision. This is because a new State is (by defi nition) not party to this Convention (but it can become party to it shortly after its independence).
91 This is what Brigitte Stern has rightly called the "hidden defect" inherent to any convention concerning matters of State succession. 92 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention may therefore be considered as a simple guideline, serving to help the actors during the process of negotiation following a declaration of independence. 
Limited Contemporary State Practice on Secession
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East Timor (2002) are undeniable examples of "Newly Independent States". The same can arguably be said about Eritrea (1991). 94 The case of the dismemberment of the USSR in 1991 is controversial. 95 All States concerned (including Russia itself) 96 have viewed Russia as the "continuator" State of the USSR. Yet, this is clearly based on a legal fi ction. Thus, the USSR did in fact cease to exist as a result of both the Declaration of Alma Ata and the Minsk Agreement. 97 Logically, Russia could not continue the existence of a State which had ceased to exist; 98 there is no "resurrection" of States in international law. 99 It should follow, logically, that the break-up of the USSR is a case of State dissolution. 100 Yet, it may be that these statements were merely political and not meant to result in the dissolution of the USSR. 101 In any event, the practice of States has considered the break-up of the USSR as a series of "secessions" by the former Soviet Republics (except for the three Baltic States). 102 103 For this reason, a few words should be said about this very peculiar example of secession involving no less than 11 new States. Under the Minsk Agreement, all successor States agreed to respect obligations arising from treaties to which the USSR was a party. 104 In spite of this general statement Overall, this confusing practice does not support the principle of "automatic" succession to treaties.
108
Since the end of the Cold War, the only "clear" case of secession has been that of Montenegro in 2006. Another very recent one, for which very limited information is currently available, is the secession of South Sudan in 2011. Given the very limited contemporary practice on secession, the present section also analyses the position adopted by two eventual candidates for independence, that of Québec and Scotland. . 110 The new Constitution, based on the principle of equality of each member State, provided Montenegro with a high degree of autonomy on the international scene. 111 Moreover, a right to secession was expressly given to each member 105 The accession of Montenegro to independence must be considered in legal terms as a case of secession. Thus, Article 60(1) of Serbia-Montenegro's Constitution mentions the right for each entity to "secede from" the Union and paragraph 4 of the same provision expressly envisaged the "secession of the state of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". 117 Finally, Article 60(5) indicates that the member pursuing secession should be considered as a new State under international law, while the other member State would be continuing the international legal personality of Serbia-Montenegro. 118 The position adopted by Serbia also shows that Montenegro is a case of secession. Following Montenegro's declaration of independence, the National Assembly of Serbia declared that Serbia was the "successor State" to Serbia-Montenegro. 119 In the context of this declaration, the word "succession" was clearly meant to proclaim Serbia as the "continuator" of the Union as shown by a letter sent to the UN Secretary-General in June 2006. 
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The independence of Montenegro (which had been admitted as a new member of the United Nations in June 2006), had some important consequences in the context of the on-going Genocide Case between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro at the ICJ. 121 Bosnia argued that Serbia and Montenegro should both remain respondents in this case. 122 Montenegro rejected this position, 123 while Serbia simply took the view that this question should be decided by the Court. 124 In its fi nal judgment, the Court fi rst noted that "the facts and events on which the fi nal submissions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are based occurred at a period of time when Serbia and Montenegro constituted a single State". 125 The Court also noted Serbia's position of continuity and its commitment to be bound by international treaties concluded by Serbia and Montenegro. 126 For the Court, "the Republic of Montenegro does not continue the legal personality of Serbia and Montenegro; it cannot therefore have acquired, on that basis, the status of Respondent in the present case."
127 Since Montenegro had not given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court over this case, 128 the Court concluded that the Republic of Serbia would remain the only respondent in this case. 129 The Court therefore clearly analysed the independence of Montenegro as a case of secession. 
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Montenegro adopted a clear position in favour of succession to multilateral treaties to which Serbia-Montenegro had been a party before the date of succession. This position is well-illustrated by Article 2 of the Declaration of Independence where Montenegro indicated that it will "initiate the process for gaining a full-fl edged membership" to a number of international organisations 130 and that it "shall accept and adhere to the rights and obligations that arise from existing arrangements" with these organisations. In other words, Montenegro stated its willingness to be party to multilateral agreements existing in the context of international organizations. Montenegro also indicated the same desire to adhere to existing bilateral agreements.
131
Article 3 of the Decision on Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Montenegro passed by the National Assembly on 3 June 2006 states that "[t]he Republic of Montenegro shall apply and adhere to international treaties and agreements that the state union of Serbia and Montenegro was party to and that relate to the Republic of Montenegro and are in conformity with its legal order". It is noteworthy that in these statements, Montenegro does not specifi cally use the expression "succession". Thus, it does not indicate its willingness to "succeed" to these treaties, but rather its decision to "adhere" to these treaties.
Montenegro's general statements were soon followed by concrete actions by the new State. It undertook the exercise of examining international treaties to decide which one it wished to accede to. 132 In October 2006, Montenegro sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General stating that it had "decided to succeed to the treaties to which 130 Reference is made to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as "other international organisations". 131 Article 3 of the Declaration of Independence states that Montenegro "shall establish and develop bilateral relations with the third states on the basis principles of the international law, accepting the rights and obligations stemming from existing arrangements and shall continue with active policy of good-neighbourly relations and regional cooperation". 132 The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains the process, in some detail, in a document entitled Information on international multilateral conventions that Montenegro accessed or is in process of accessing: "Immediately after the proclamation of independence of Montenegro ... The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro undertook activities to determine the manner of taking over international multilateral conventions, agreements and protocols, which the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro accessed, and which Montenegro has interest to access. In the fi rst phase, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commenced the procedure for accessing to relevant multilateral documents ... In the second phase the procedure for accessing to relevant multilateral conventions deposited with the UN Secretary General was initiated, which contracting party or signor also was the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro i.e. FRY. In the third phase the procedure was initiated for accessing to multilateral conventions which depositories are individual countries." The document lists all treaties of different international organisations that have been acceded to as well as those treaties for which a State is the depository.
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the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was a party or signatory". 133 Montenegro also sent a similar letter informing the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that it "wishes to succeed" to a long list of conventions and treaties to which Serbia-Montenegro was a party on 3 June 2006 (and that such succession took place retroactively from that date). 134 It is noteworthy that in these letters sent to the UN Secretary-General and UNESCO, Montenegro explicitly refers to its willingness to "succeed" to these treaties, and not merely to adhere to them. Soon after its independence, Montenegro also applied for membership to the Council of Europe to succeed to several treaties, which had been originally ratifi ed by Serbia-Montenegro. 135 One year later, the Council of Europe decided that Montenegro was to be regarded as a party to the Convention and related Protocols In sum, Montenegro is a clear example wherein the secessionist State adopted the principle of continuity of treaties to which the predecessor was a party.
5.2.
The Position of Québec The hypothesis of an independent Québec would undeniably be an example of secession. Thus, Québec's situation simply cannot be considered in the context of decolonisation. Also, in all likelihood, Québec's secession would not result in the collapse of Canada. In the 1998 Quebec Secession case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered this hypothetical case as one of secession. 138 Once elected into government on 12 September 1994, the Parti Québécois (pro-independence) proposed a Draft Bill on the Sovereignty of Québec as a platform of the position of an independent Québec in matters of foreign policy and negotiations with Canada. 139 Article 7 of the Draft Bill indicates the position of the government of Québec on the question of succession with regards to treaties:
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Québec shall assume the obligations and enjoys the rights arising out of the treaties to which Canada is party and in the international conventions to which Canada is a signatory, in accordance with the rules of international law. 140 The report prepared by the National Commission on the Future of Québec stated:
The Government of Québec chose to conform to the practice of continuity of treaties. It intends to continue to apply the treaties concluded by Canada and the international conventions adhered to or ratifi ed by Canada, and which remain applicable to the territory of Québec in accordance with the rules of international law. This decision, rendered consecutively to the achievement of sovereignty, expresses Québec's clear will to fully participate in the international community's life and relations. 141 Finally, this position was refl ected in Article 15 of Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, which was adopted by the National Assembly of Québec on 7 September 1995:
In accordance with the rules of international law, Québec shall assume the obligations and enjoy the rights set forth in the relevant treaties and international conventions and agreement to which Canada or Québec is a party on the date on which Québec becomes a sovereign country, in particular in the North American Free Trade Agreement. supra note 12, at p. 901). Article 15 of the Bill indicates that the principle of treaty continuity also applies to "international agreements" ("ententes internationales") to which Québec is party at the date of succession. In accordance with the so-called "Gérin-Lajoie" doctrine, Québec has entered into a large number of international agreements with other States on subject-matters within its constitutional powers. Québec considers these agreements as treaties under international law. As of 2012, Québec had entered into 709 such "ententes internationales" (376 of them have entered into force). 144 The adoption of this legal position created ample controversy. Thus, intense debates had opposed the two primary political parties of Québec regarding the particular question of the succession of Québec to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 145 Writers are also divided on the question of Québec's succession to treaties, and in particular, on whether Québec would succeed to the NAFTA. 
5.3.
The Position of Scotland It should be emphasised at the outset that the independence of Scotland would be considered as a clear case of secession. Thus, it is unlikely that the United King-
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Thus, in 1997 and 1999, the SNP released dossiers on the legal basis for independence in which it relied on the legal opinions of lawyers to defend its position to automatic succession to the EU. 158 The Scottish government has, however, refused to disclose the legal advice it has received on the issue.
159
For the UK government, an independent Scotland would, on the contrary, be required to apply anew for membership to the EU while the UK's membership would continue. 160 Scotland's claim for automatic succession to the EU has also recently been addressed by the European Commission itself. In response to a European Parliamentary Question from Welsh MEP Eluned Morgan in 2004, the Commission answered (without specifi cally referring to Scotland) that a newly independent State would be outside the EU and would need to apply for membership of the EU in the same way as any other non-member. 161 In September 2012, . When a part of the territory of a Member State ceases to be a part of the state, e.g. because that territory becomes an independent state, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a newly independent region would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore on its territory. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union may apply to become a member of the Union. An application of this type requires, if the application is accepted by the Council acting unanimously, a negotiation on an agreement between the Applicant State and the Member States on the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the treaties which such admission entails. This agreement is subject to ratifcation by all Member States and the Applicant State."
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In any event, suffi ce it to say for the purposes of this paper that Scotland's position on succession to international organizations suggests (to some extent) that it also supports the general principle of continuity to multilateral treaties. The offi cial position of the UK government is that there would be no automatic succession and that Scotland would have to go through the process of becoming a party to each treaty. A new secessionist State is therefore entirely free to decide whether or not it wants to be bound by the treaties to which the predecessor State is a party.
In our opinion, the question of State succession with regards to treaties in the context of secession is a clear illustration of contradictory values in contemporary international law. On the one hand, the principle of the equality of sovereign States and that of liberty surely militates in favour of the application of the principle of tabula rasa to new States. 171 In fact, one of the most important attributes of State sovereignty is undoubtedly the ability to decide with whom and in which domain a State desires to maintain conventional relations. On the other hand, as sovereign as it may be, it nevertheless remains that a new State "devient partie intégrante du système international préexistant, dont il se doit de respecter l'intégrité et la cohérence". 172 A new State not only benefi ts from rights under international law, but it also inherits the-european-union>; Murkens, supra note 158, at pp. Our approach in favour of the adoption of a presumption of continuity of treaties in the case of secession relies on the recent practice adopted by States with regards to dissolution of States. In our opinion, despite the fundamental conceptual distinction between the notions of dissolution and secession, there is no reason to refuse to apply to future cases of secession the solution of continuity which was adopted in recent State practice in the context of dissolution of States. Although secession has unique characteristics, it should not follow that a different legal regime should necessarily prevail over the existing regime relative to the dissolution of States. This is all the more so considering that cases of dismemberment of States in recent years have demonstrated that qualifying a State as continuator or not is largely attributed to political considerations. These considerations have often more to do with the given circumstances of each case and with power politics rather than pure legal analysis. In fact, as pointed out by Brigitte Stern, geopolitical reasons prevailing at the time ultimately explain why the break-up process of the USSR and that of Yugoslavia were treated differently from a legal standpoint. 178 In our view, the existence of a presumption of continuity of treaties in the case of secession is also supported by the recent practice of Montenegro. Upon its independence, the new State fi rst made some general statements expressing its willingness to succeed to all multilateral treaties to which the union State of Serbia-Montenegro was a party. This was followed by notifi cations that were sent to the depositories of treaties whereby Montenegro specifi cally indicated to which treaties it was succeeding. This presumption of continuity of treaties is also clearly privileged by Québec -a potential candidate for secession (and to some extent also supported by the general position adopted by Scotland).
It is, however, in our opinion, premature to discuss the emergence of any customary rule of international law according to which the secessionist State would automatically succeed to the treaties concluded by the predecessor State. 179 This is also the position adopted by Judge Kréca (judge ad-hoc of the FRY) in his dissident opinion in the Genocide case. 180 It must be noted, however, that for some authors it is the rule of tabula rasa that should apply to contemporary cases of secession.
The situation is completely different in present post-colonial time. Today, a new State has a clear interest in being bound by the vast majority of treaties concluded by the predecessor State. In this context, the application of the rule of continuity could not be considered in any way as some sort "punishment" for the new State. To the contrary, the new secessionist States would be the benefi ciaries of the application of such a rule. In this context, the political reasons that guided the ILC in the 1970s in adopting the continuity principle are simply no longer of any relevance in modern international law.
Finally, the approach in favour of a presumption of continuity of treaties is dictated by practical considerations. New States generally have few resources and little experience concerning complex questions of international law, such as those relative to succession to treaties. 186 Furthermore, these questions are not generally considered priorities in the context of the process leading to independence of the new State. For these reasons, new States would benefi t from this presumption of continuity by allowing them a reasonable amount of time to take a fi nal stand on matters related to succession to treaties of the predecessor State.
Commenting on the 1978 Vienna Convention, one of the most qualifi ed legal experts with regards to State succession, Professor Daniel P. O'Connell, had already evoked in 1979 the possibility of applying such a presumption of continuity:
We have set up a system for successor States to avoid maintaining treaties and then an elaborated machinery, which is time-consuming and administratively debilitating, to enable them to avoid the consequences of avoidance of the maintenance of treaties, that is, to enable them to continue treaties which they want to continue while adhering to the general idea of not being bound to do so. … I wonder whether there would be any practical difference if we reverse the matter, beginning with supposition that treaties remain in force for successor States, without distinction between the types of succession, and then leave the successor State to terminate them under the renunciation clauses. 187 We do not hesitate to subscribe, some 33 years later, to a position in favour of a presumption of continuity of treaties in the case of secession to insure the stability of international relations.
